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UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: FEATURES AND SPECIFICS OF TRANSFORMATION

The birth of the Ukrainian historical narrative can reasonably be dated to the end of the XIX – the first two decades of the XX century. From the point of view of the chronology of Ukrainian history, the narrative born at the end of the 19th century claimed that Ukrainians were an older people than Russians and Belarusians, which is why they have an inalienable right to sovereign political, social, economic and cultural development. At the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century, the Ukrainian historical narrative is still far from the ideal of Ukrainian history as the history of part of Europe. It is clear to everyone that the interpretation of the history of Ukraine needs to be reworked and comprehended, creating a new, purely own understanding. However, to this day, as evidenced by the concrete works of Ukrainian historians, the stereotypes of both the oppressed national and imperial past are still unresolved. The methods used today in micro- and macro-historical research will certainly make the Ukrainian past fuller and truer, expanding its life experience of people of different nationalities, cultures and political views who inhabited this area in the past or live here today. The consolidation of Ukrainian society requires the transfer of conflicting interpretations of events and processes into the sphere of public dialogue and their resolution through European democratic mechanisms. In European political culture, this is a tradition of pluralism, that is, the recognition of the norm of multiplicity of memories and interpretations. The European principle is not intended to impose a single reading of history, but to understand the conditions for the coexistence of different experiences. It is especially important for Ukraine to pursue a historical policy in a way that will promote national historical reconciliation. To consolidate society, it is necessary to promote topics that unite all regions.

Key words: *historical narrative, Ukrainian historical narrative, ethnic identity, self-identity, imperial ideology.*

Problem. The birth of the Ukrainian historical narrative can reasonably be dated to the end of the XIX – the first two decades of the XX century. From the point of view of the chronology of Ukrainian history, the narrative born at the end of the 19th century claimed that Ukrainians were an older people than Russians and Belarusians, which is why they have an inalienable right to sovereign political, social, economic and cultural development. The origins of Ukrainian history and its beginning of this historical narrative, in accordance with the need to justify antiquity, were pushed as far as possible into the depths of the centuries.

As a result, the Ukrainian narrative very easily “appropriated” for itself and only for itself the entire history of Kievan Rus and Orthodox Christianity in these areas. Such interpretation from the

very beginning made the Ukrainian narrative quite the opposite of traditional imperial Russian historiography and created an eternal conflict between them.

As for the territorial boundaries of the new Ukrainian narrative, the history of Orthodox Ukraine within the Russian Empire and the history of Greek Catholic Ukraine within the Austro-Hungarian Empire were positioned as an eternal whole, divided purely by the political whims of the great empires. This idea can be called the merit of M. Hrushevsky compared with similar European variations, such as the construction of the Belgian historical narrative of A. Piren.

Purpose. The national narrative viewed Ukrainian history as the formation of the Ukrainian people as a result of a series of ups and downs. Like the nineteenth-century European romantics and positivist historians who created the myths of national history awakened by the wars of liberation, Ukrainian historians also believed and worked to “awaken” their nation from its long sleep. Accordingly, the Ukrainian national narrative was teleological, and its ultimate goal was to “awaken the people”, to oppose oppression and exploitation [1, p. 605–649].

Results and discussion. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence, the national paradigm became dominant in Ukrainian historiography. It seemed that the historiographical Ukrainian nation had finally won the historiographical competition with the ruling dynasties, states, and the domination of the Russian and Polish nations [2, p. 29–46]. This victory in the mid-1990s seemed extraordinary and very promising. Many new topics have been opened for historical research, many lost names have been restored, and the Russian and Polish historiographical traditions have been criticized. However, did a new version of Ukrainian history emerge against this background? Unfortunately, we have to give a mostly negative answer to this question.

During the nationalization of the Ukrainian past, not only important aspects of territorial and cultural history were ignored, but also a large number of ethnic Ukrainians. For example, during M. Hrushevsky's lifetime he was criticized for actually replacing the early modern history of Ukraine with the history of the Cossacks – without a doubt, an important element of contemporary Ukrainian society, which, however, was its minority. The main historiographical concepts of M. Hrushevsky can be summarized in the following theses:

1) Continuity of the Ukrainian historical process from the early days to the new period of Ukrainian history, which covered state and non-state periods;

2) In the periodization of the history of Ukraine there are early, medieval, Lithuanian-Polish, Cossack-Hetman stages of the historical development of the Ukrainian people and its statehood, which ends with the national revival of the XIX century and the new Ukrainian state of the UPR in the XX century;

3) Ants should be considered the ancestors of the Ukrainian people;

4) Hypotheses of n and other historians about the “all-Russian” people, which included Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, must be rejected. They do not stand up to scientific criticism and lead to the falsification of the history of Eastern Europe. The same can be attributed to the “ancient-Russian people”, which was promoted by Soviet historians and which continued the concept of “all-Russian” people;

5) In historical research, the center of gravity must be transferred from the history of the state to the history of the people, society. The state factor in the development of the people is important, but in addition to it we must consider cultural and economic factors, which in some periods are more or less important than the political. This, of course, is linked to state and non-state periods of Ukrainian history;

6) In the objective reconstruction of the history of Eastern Europe it is necessary to study separately the national histories of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians [3, p. 160–217].

If the national narrative of Ukrainian history does not cover even all Ukrainians, let alone other ethnic groups. A. Kappeler argued that it is almost impossible to study only ethnic Ukrainians and on this basis to create a history of all state institutions, economy, trade or urban centers of Ukraine [4, p. 51–80]. They were undoubtedly the majority in rural areas, but in cities dominated by Russians, Jews, Poles, and Germans, they were in the minority. On the one hand, it would be dishonest to claim

that there is no place for minorities in the Ukrainian national narrative. However, they were usually portrayed as aggressors, oppressors and exploiters, in the struggle against which the Ukrainian nation was born. In today's Ukrainian historical science, it is possible to note some separate positive shifts in attempts of research and creation of multiethnic history of Ukraine [5, p. 147]. However, the realization that all existing national minorities need to be included in the new great narrative of Ukrainian history is slow and does not always demonstrate qualitative scientific results. Many examples of such stories tend to be regional or local, and often have a political overtone.

P.R. Magocsi made the first serious attempt to write the territorial, multiethnic and multicultural history of Ukraine. His extensive work, almost 800 pages long, first published in 1996, became an alternative to the more traditional narrative of O. Subtelny in 1988, which was repeatedly republished in Ukrainian and Russian translations in Ukraine, and in the first years of independence even used as a textbook in Ukrainian universities. P.R. Magocsi managed to write the history of Ukraine not only longer but also much fuller than O. Subtelny, because he placed in it many historical figures, facts and events, which in the traditional presentation of the material was not before him, although they had a significant impact on the understanding of the past and present of Ukraine. The general concept and sections of Magocsi's "History of Ukraine", devoted to the peoples of Eastern and Western Ukraine, give a vivid idea of the novelty of his approach to Ukrainian history. This novelty is easy to trace by comparing in detail his recently published work "Ukraine: An Illustrated History" with its distant prototype, M. Hrushevsky's "Illustrated History of Ukraine", published in 1911. For example, we can take an illustrative material of books by M. Hrushevsky and P. R. Magocsi on the cultural history of Eastern Ukraine in the XIX century. Thus, both contain portraits of I. Kotlyarevsky, T. Shevchenko, M. Kostomarov, P. Kulish and M. Drahomanov among other Ukrainian figures of the time. However, P. R. Magocsi goes beyond the Ukrainian national movement and the narrative of M. Hrushevsky and adds portraits of M. Gogol, Baal Shem Tova, Sholom Aleichem, Y. B. Zaleski and I. Gasprinsky [6; 7] P. R. Magocsi's historical narrative is undoubtedly richer than M. Hrushevsky's narrative and pays much more attention to the multiethnic and multicultural history of Ukraine, introducing pro-Russian personalities, leading representatives of the Jewish, Polish and Crimean Tatar cultural revivals in Ukraine. Of course, it should not be overlooked that Magocsi's "Illustrated History of Ukraine" is separated from the work of M. Hrushevsky by almost a hundred years of history and many new ideas and concepts in the development of world historiography. In general, it should be noted that the concept proposed by P.R. Magocsi looks more modern and meets the requirements of today.

Thus, there was a need to form a Ukrainian national narrative, to create their own concept of national history, the core of which, of course, were Ukrainians, and their neighbors were often either virtually unnoticed or presented as opponents in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood. Many contemporary Ukrainian and Western historians of Ukraine raise the issue of revising the classical paradigm of national history, calling for "rewriting" the history of Ukraine with a view, among other things, to a multiethnic approach. The new approach, of course, has both advantages and disadvantages. Most researchers believe that there should be a place in the history of Ukraine for the peoples who lived and live in Ukraine, but Ukrainians should remain the leading actors in Ukrainian history. A. Kappeler believes that the multiethnic approach has the same weaknesses as the ethno-national one, because it can also fall into primordialism, think in teleological terms and marginalize non-ethnic groups and institutions [4, p. 107–115].

I. Kolesnyk quite systematically outlined the theoretical and methodological parameters of the problem of narrative. As the researcher rightly remarked, "in modern literature there is a whole fan of concepts that have the same essence" [9, p. 154]. In particular, attention was drawn to a number of interesting works by foreign authors, in which the metanarrative is interpreted as a methodology that integrates historical, psychological and cultural perspectives. Important in this case is that "within such a methodology the role of self-reflection / self-interpretation increases, due to the deepening integration of the contexts of life experience a greater ontological integrity of knowledge about the life of the individual is achieved" [7, p. 158].

In this sense, the problem of synthesis, questions of functionality and coherence of the narrative should be an organic part of the discussion on the Ukrainian narrative as an intellectual project and a moral task.

At the end of 2012, the columns of the Ukrainian Historical Journal have been discussing the conceptual foundations of writing national history. For example, L.O. Zashkilnyak argues that “any community (ethnic, national, state) cannot exist without its “biography”, which legitimizes its existence and current state” [10, p. 88], O.M. Mayboroda convinced that «national history deserves to be more alive than dead” [11, p. 25], K. Yu. Halushko calls for the fact that the Ukrainian national grand narrative should be written and published, because it is necessary and should be useful “historically conditioned” Ukrainians of the XXI century [12, p. 22]. Instead, S.M. Plokhly believes that “the task of the new Ukrainian historiography is not to diversify the national paradigm, but to go beyond it” [13, p. 7].

The methodological discussion allows us to conclude that under the current conditions the problem of the Ukrainian narrative has two main dimensions of actualization. The first is the fate of the “great narrative” in the modern conditions of the unfolding of the “historiographical revolution”; the second dimension is a special social function of narrative and modern speech practices in the space of real history.

In fact, the discussion in the pages of the Ukrainian Historical Journal turned into a collection of arguments and counter-arguments in favor of proving the expediency of preserving a purely national narrative.

It should be noted that the arguments for preserving the national narrative boil down to the thesis that it is too early to go beyond the national paradigm and the belief of many Ukrainian historians that integration processes provoke the erosion of sovereignty of modern nation-states and globalization limits the possibilities of nation-states.

Counter-arguments appear more convincing, as their representatives not only criticize but also offer their versions of the Ukrainian narrative. The new proposals are contained, in particular, in a collection edited by G. Kasianov and Ph. Ther “Ukraine as a Laboratory of Transnational History” [14]. This collection examines the problematic aspects of the creation of national histories based on the tragic and multiethnic past. The authors generally take an optimistic creative position and believe that transnational approaches can be applied to the history of Ukraine. Such an approach, which is gaining more and more supporters in Ukraine and considers it as a civilizational and cultural border. That is, both as a dividing line and a bridge between Central and Eastern Europe. This approach has been successfully applied to the histories of other Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland and Hungary. At the same time, Ukraine fits into this paradigm, because throughout its history it has been a kind of social and cultural stimulus in the interaction of civilizations, ethnic groups, cultures, in the process of which the fundamental features of the Ukrainian civilization and cultural aura were formed.

In the general movement of the national historiographical tradition, the interpretation of Ukraine as a cultural border between the Christian East and the West is connected with the classic research works of I. Lysyak-Rudnytsky and I. Ševčenko [15; 16; 17; 18]. As we have already noted, in recent years Ukrainian historians have already begun to move in the direction of writing the history of Ukraine as a multiethnic country and cultural border. They are facilitated by their experience in studying the history of Ukraine as part of the Polish, Russian or Ottoman territories, depending on the specific historical period. The socio-cultural space of Ukraine is the result of movements of powerful cultural and historical influences, the intersection and imposition of many external waves. It is not finalized. Borders within the country are not so much clear demarcation lines as blurred contact zones. Such vagueness and a certain uncertainty is, on the one hand, a serious challenge for Ukraine as an integral state, on the other – the possibility of harmonizing cooperation. In this sense, the process of state formation of Ukraine fundamentally depends on the successful arrangement and ordering of socio-cultural space in spite of existing external influences.

Many centuries of being on the borders of historical development have led to the blurring and fragmentation of Ukrainian identity. At all times, state borders have been created and guarded to

divide people, neighboring border areas were areas of contact where economic transactions (legal and illegal), loyalty contests, and identity interactions took place. The Ukrainian steppe frontier became the birthplace of a special cohort of steppe inhabitants – the Cossacks – and the corresponding type of identity. They are usually seen as staunch fighters against Islam and nomads of the steppe. However, within the national narrative of Ukrainian history, it remains unclear why the Cossacks chose the Turkic name, wore wide trousers, like their enemies from the Ottoman Empire, shaved their heads like their Crimean Tatar opponents, and why their most famous image is embodied in paintings. Cossack Mamaia, who sits in the position of Buddha. The answer to these questions is quite simple. The Cossacks not only despised state borders, constantly causing headaches to their nominal rulers from Warsaw and Moscow, but also destroyed the cultural borders that divided the steppe and populated areas, Christianity and Islam, Polish aristocratic democracy and Moscow autocracy. Awakening interest in the histories of empires in the West and in the former USSR encourages researchers of Ukrainian history to use comparative approaches. The study of the Ukrainian past provides a unique opportunity to explore the relationship between the center and the periphery, as well as between different peripheries, bypassing the center of the empire. In A. Kappeler's famous book, the author makes an interesting observation – the farther the ethnos was from the center of the cultural circle, the more powerless it was on the one hand, and on the other hand it had more chances to preserve its national identity. In this situation, a special phenomenon arises – a new type of ethnic identification of Ukrainians, which the scientist defined as situational identification [8]. T. Martin's work "An Affirmative Action Empire" allows us to better understand the role of Ukraine in the development of national policy of the Soviet Union [19]. R. Szporluk's study encourages researchers to analyze in more detail the influence of the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires on the further history of Ukraine [20].

Of course, much remains to be done to engage Ukrainian history in the world historical narrative. But there is one thing that Ukrainian historians lack, and that is the presence of topics that allow them to do so: whether it is the history of the two world wars, or the revolution of 1917, or the history of communism, or environmental history (within which Chernobyl is and will remain an extremely important event). The Ukrainian historical narrative after 1991 is still far from the ideal of Ukrainian history as the history of part of Europe, which was formulated by M. Drahomanov back in 1891. From the point of view of M. Drahomanov it is important not only to cover all periods of the past of Ukraine, but also to characterize urban tendencies, demography, ideological context: "Growth and decline of the population, economy, ideas and customs within society and the state, education, as well as direct and indirect participation of Ukrainians of all classes and cultures in the development of European history and culture" [13, p. 156]. It is clear to everyone that the interpretation of the history of Ukraine needs to be reworked and comprehended, creating a new, purely own understanding. However, to this day, as evidenced by the specific works of Ukrainian historians, still unresolved stamps of both the oppressed national and imperial past [22, p. 988]. The methods used today in micro- and macro-historical research will certainly make the Ukrainian past fuller and truer, expanding its life experience of people of different nationalities, cultures and political views who inhabited this area in the past or live here today. The consolidation of Ukrainian society requires the transfer of conflicting interpretations of events and processes into the sphere of public dialogue and their resolution through European democratic mechanisms. In European political culture, this is a tradition of pluralism, that is, the recognition of the norm of multiplicity of memories and interpretations. The European principle is not intended to impose a single reading of history, but to understand the conditions for the coexistence of different experiences. It is especially important for Ukraine to pursue a historical policy in a way that will promote national historical reconciliation. To consolidate society, it is necessary to promote topics that unite all regions.

Conclusions. The Ukrainian historical narrative of the late XIX and early XX centuries. was based on the understanding of Ukrainians as a people older than the Russians, and, accordingly, gave them the inalienable right to sovereign cultural and political development without any obstacles from their younger brother. Territorially, he linked the history of Orthodox Ukraine within the Russian Empire with the history of Greek Catholic Ukraine within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In general, the

national narrative viewed Ukrainian history as the formation of the Ukrainian people as a result of a series of ups and downs and had the ultimate goal of “awakening” its nation.

After 1991, the national paradigm became dominant in Ukrainian historiography, but there is still no single version of the Ukrainian narrative. The most successful today are the proposals of supporters of a transnational approach to the history of Ukraine. This approach considers Ukraine as a civilizational and cultural border. That is, both as a dividing line and a bridge between Central and Eastern Europe. This approach has been successfully applied to the histories of other Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland and Hungary.

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УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ ІСТОРИЧНИЙ НАРАТИВ: ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА СПЕЦИФІКА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ

Зародження українського історичного наративу можна свідомо віднести до кінця XIX – перших двох десятиліть XX століття. З точки зору хронології української історії наратив, народжений наприкінці XIX ст., стверджував, що українці є старшим народом, ніж росіяни та білоруси, тому вони мають невід’ємне право на суверенний політичний, соціальний, економічний та культурний розвиток. На початку другого десятиліття XXI століття український історичний наратив все ще далекий від ідеалу української історії як історії частини Європи. Всім зрозуміло, що трактування історії України необхідно переробити та осмислити, створивши нове, суто власне розуміння. Однак до сьогодні, як свідчать конкретні праці українських істориків, все ще неподолані штампми як пригнобленого національного, так й імперського минулого. Методи, які сьогодні використовують у межах мікро- та макроісторичних досліджень, неодмінно зроблять українську минувшину повнішою та більш правдивою, розширивши її життєвим досвідом людей різних національностей, культур і політичних поглядів, які населяли цю територію в минулому чи живуть тут сьогодні. Консолідація українського суспільства вимагає переведення конфліктних тлумачень подій та процесів у сферу публічного діалогу та вирішення їх за допомогою європейських демократичних механізмів. У європейській політичній культурі це традиція плюралізму, тобто визнання нормою множинності пам’ятей та інтерпретацій. Європейський принцип має на меті не нав’язування одного прочитання історії, а осмислення умов співіснування різних досвідів. Для України особливо важливо провадити історичну політику в такому вигляді, який буде сприяти національному історичному примиренню. Для консолідації суспільства на сучасному рівні треба популяризувати саме такі теми, які об’єднують усі регіони.

Ключові слова: історичний наратив, український історичний наратив, етнічна ідентичність, самоідентичність, імперська ідеологія.